This paper shows theoretically and empirically that an aggregate Euler equation relates the growth rate of per capita consumption to the real interest rate, the ratio of private wealth plus asset income to consumption, and the ratio of social security wealth to consumption. Using the estimated Euler equation, the paper then calculates the steady-state effects of social security reform. Reforms that reduce the ratio of social security wealth to consumption are found to shift the balanced growth paths for the capital stock, output, and consumption upward appreciably. 
I. Introduction
The reform of the US social security system is now attracting much attention. A wide range of proposals for reform have been put forward, ranging from modest modifications to complete privatization. 1 In choosing among these reforms, it is important to quantify how they would affect the aggregate economy. A given reform is presumably more likely to command support, the more favorable its aggregate effects are on net.
In recent years, economists have typically quantified the effects of social security reform in large computational general-equilibrium models based on the lifecycle hypothesis; e.g., Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (1998) . Although the calibration of these models does make use of data, the models are not designed to fit the aggregate data in any very well-defined sense. Rather, the lifecycle structure of the model is simply imposed, and the parameters are chosen in order to match a few select moments of the aggregate data. The lifecycle hypothesis is not the only possible model of consumer behavior, however. Indeed, like all models, it abstracts from many empirically important phenomena. 2 Moreover, computational general-equilibrium models have not typically been validated on data other than those used for calibrating them. 3 One might therefore reasonably doubt the empirical validity of the effects calculated in such models.
An older literature attempted to estimate the effects of social security directly. The seminal study in this literature is Feldstein (1974) , who reports that ceteris paribus, social security increases consumption and lowers saving substantially. As a result, the balanced growth paths for capital, output, and consumption are lowered substantially. Many other studies followed. 4 They reported mixed results, with perhaps a presumption that social security raises consumption ceteris paribus.
1 Some examples are Aaron and Bosworth (1997) , Advisory Committee on Social Security (1997), Altig and Gokhale (1997) , Diamond (1996) , Feldstein (1996a) , Feldstein and Samwick (1997) , Gramlich (1998) , Sachs (1997), and Mariger (1997) . 2 For example, Attanasio and Weber (1995b) find strong microevidence that changes in family structure across the lifecycle affect the height and slope of the age-consumption profile, Kotlikoff (1988) establishes that bequests and intervivos gifts contribute greatly to aggregate wealth, and Zeldes (1989) provides microevidence that some households are borrowing-constrained. 3 In this regard, the practice in economics lags considerably behind that in engineering, where model calibration is also a widespread practice. Engineers, however, simulate the results of experiments that they subsequently perform. They do not regard a model as validated unless it can accurately predict the data generated in many such experiments. 4 For example, see Barro (1978) ; Barro and MacDonald (1979) ; Burkhauser and Turner (1982) ; Darby (1978) ; Evans (1983) ; Feldstein (1980 Feldstein ( , 1982 Feldstein ( , 1996b ; Feldstein and Pellechio (1979) ; Koskela and Viren (1983) ; Kopits and Gotur (1980) ; Kotlikoff (1979) ; Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) ; Meguire (1996) ; Modigliani and Sterling (1979) ; Munnell (1974); and von Furstenburg (1979) . Page (1998) exhaustively and critically reviews this literature.
For the most part, this literature investigated the issue by fitting "consumption functions" of is an error term. 5 If β 3 turns out to be positive and statistically significant, social security is inferred to raise consumption and lower saving ceteris paribus and to lower the balanced growth paths for private wealth, output, and consumption. Unfortunately, equation (1) is at best an approximate reduced form of the life-cycle model and at worst bears no relationship to any well-known structural model; see Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983) . If it can be interpreted as a good approximation to a reduced form, its parameters confound structural and expectational parameters.
For example, even if Ricardian equivalence holds so that social security is completely neutral, β 3 can be positive if social security wealth is positively correlated with future disposable wage incomes, conditional on the other regressors. Conversely, even if β 3 is estimated to be insignificantly different from zero, social security may still increase consumption appreciably since social security wealth may be negatively correlated with future disposable wage incomes, conditional on the other regressors. In principle, these problems could be overcome by estimating a variant of equation (1) jointly with auxiliary forecasting equations for the components of future disposable wage income while imposing the cross-equation restrictions implied by rational expectations. In practice, this task is too formidable to attempt.
Another problem with equation (1) is that the variables included in it are likely to be difference stationary. If the error term e t is also difference stationary, least squares is inconsistent.
If instead it is mean stationary, the parameters are estimated superconsistently. Nevertheless, unless e t is also uncorrelated with ∆y t , ∆a t , ∆s t , and ∆x t contemporaneously and at all leads and lags, the standard errors are inconsistent and standard procedures produce invalid inferences. 6 Moreover, correlation is required by the intertemporal budget constraint.
5 Some of the studies put per capita saving or per capita private assets in the left-hand member in lieu of per capita consumption. Clearly, such regressions can be rewritten in the form (1). Others do not deflate by population, a dubious but probably inconsequential practice. 6 For proof of the previous three assertions and further discussion, see Hamilton (1994), pp. 557-561, 586-589, 602-608. In this paper, I also attempt to estimate the effects of social security directly. 
is estimated using lagged instrumental variables, the estimates of ψ 2 and ψ 3 should have zero probability limits. In equation (3), π t is after-tax asset income in period t and u t is an error term that has a zero mean and finite variance and is posited to be orthogonal to all lagged information. If instead either ψ 2 or ψ 3 is estimated to be significantly negative, fairly convincing evidence would then exist against either Ricardian equivalence or the other maintained assumptions.
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There is a straightforward intuition for why ψ 2 and ψ 3 should be negative. Suppose that Ricardian equivalence does not hold and, in particular, existing households do not fully offset additional government intergenerational transfers in their favor. Suppose further that households experience an unanticipated increase in wealth, which could take the form of a budget deficit, a windfall receipt of asset income, or an increase in the generosity of the social security system. Such an event would induce an instantaneous jump in per capita consumption, followed by decreased growth in per capita consumption over some period of time in order to satisfy the aggregate intertemporal budget constraint. The initially higher and flatter path for per capita consumption would lower the balanced growth path for private wealth. In a closed or large open economy, the balanced growth path for capital stock would also be lower and that for the real interest rate, higher.
This paper fits equation (3) (2) typically reject them at low significance levels; e.g., Hansen and Singleton (1983) . Second, using the method advocated by Campbell and Mankiw (1989 , 1990 , 1991 , the paper finds no evidence for binding constraints on borrowing in a variant of equation (3). Third, because the estimates of ψ 2 and ψ 3 are highly significantly negative, Ricardian equivalence is decisively rejected. Fourth, social security reform can raise the balanced growth paths for the capital stock, output, and consumption appreciably. Fifth, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for consumption is estimated to be a highly statistically significant .63. By contrast, the large literature that has estimated variants of equation (2) has typically obtained estimates less than .1; e.g., Hall (1988) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a theoretical explanation for why (a t +π t )/c t and s t /c t appear in model (3) if intergenerational connectedness is imperfect so that Ricardian equivalence fails. Section III reports the results from fitting models (2) and (3). Section IV investigates the effects of social security reform implied by the empirical model of section III. Finally, section V concludes.
II. Theory
Suppose that households face perfect capital and insurance markets and maximize identical intertemporally separable objective functions characterized by a constant subjective discount rate ρ.
Suppose further that their consumption choices are separable from their other choices and that α, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for consumption, is constant. In that case, the following first-order condition for a maximum holds:
where r t is the real rate of return realized between periods t-1 and t on any financial asset and ! c t and " c t −1 are the per capita consumptions of the households that inhabit the economy in both periods t-1 and t. On the assumption that the second-and higher-order conditional moments of 
where ψ 0 is a constant parameter and
Equation (6) implies that the error term u t is orthogonal to all information available in period t-1.
If everyone entering and exiting the economy over time is connected to existing households by operative altruistic bequest or gift motives, ! c t and " c t −1 can be measured by c t and c t-1 , the per capita consumptions in periods t and t-1. In that case, equation (5) can be implemented by applying the generalized method of moments (GMM) to 0 1 ln ln (1 ) ,
The resulting estimate of ψ 1 should converge in probability to α, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, when the instrumental variables are dated t-1 or earlier. Furthermore, if equation (2) is augmented with additional variables, the coefficients on these variables should converge in probability to zero. Equation (2) is therefore eminently testable.
Equation ( (4) 
The assumptions of the text therefore imply that {ln[(1 ) /(1 )] ln( / )} must also be a constant.
Equation (5) then follows immediately. (1 )
and (1 ) .
Hence,
Equation (9) implies that except by happenstance, Olivier Blanchard (1984) and Philippe Weil (1987) consider a special case in which the entry and exit rates are constant and independent of age and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is one. In this special case, appendix A establishes that to a close approximation, the second and third terms in the right-hand member of equation (9) 
holds with ψ 2 < 0 and ψ 3 < 0. This approximation may be adequate, however, even if the entry and exit rates vary to some extent by age and over time and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution differs somewhat from one.
There is a straightforward intuition for why the second and third terms in the right-hand member of equation (9) are related to (a t +π t )/c t and s t /c t . If all households choose to consume less early in their lifecycles and more late in their lifecycles, they must end up holding a larger stock of assets and receiving more asset income in aggregate. Furthermore, the more social security wealth they have, the more taxes they pay early in the lifecycle and more pension benefits they receive late in the lifecycle. This shift in disposable income from early to late in their lifecycles can leave the aggregate stock of assets and asset income constant only if consumption also shifts from early to late in their lifecycles. As a result, an increase in private wealth plus asset income or in social security wealth is associated with a reduced c b and an increased c d .
If the approximations leading to equation (3) Hansen (1982) can therefore be used to gauge the adequacy of these approximations. Failure to reject the overidentifying orthogonality conditions imposed in fitting equation (3) would then suggest that the approximations are adequate.
Given model adequacy, it is reasonable to suppose that at least approximately, the GMM estimator of ψ 1 converges in probability to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and those for ψ 2 and ψ 3 converge in probability to negative values. Furthermore, one can test the hypothesis of perfect intergenerational connectedness because the augmented Euler equation (3) 
III. Empirics
This section reports the results of fitting equations (2) and (3) to annual US data. The ultimate goal is to determine how social security affects the aggregate economy.
According to the theory, period t refers to a discrete point in time. As a result, c t is ideally a flow realized at the instant t; a t and s t are stocks realized at the instant t-1 and predetermined at the instant t; π t is the asset income earned from the instant t-1, when a t is realized, to the instant t, when c t is realized; and r t is the real after-tax rate of return realized on an asset acquired at the instant t-1 and held until the instant t. In practice, the data on c t are measured as cumulated flows over intervals of time such as months, quarters, and years. This complication does not cause any problems, however, so long as the interval over which the flows are cumulated extends backward less than one period. 11, 12 In that case, the error term u t in equation (3) 
where i t-1 is the average nominal annualized and digitized yield on one-year Treasury discount bonds during the fourth quarter of year t-1 and P t is the deflator for expenditure on nondurable goods and services in the fourth quarter of year t. Hall (1988) has discussed the case =1,
showing that 0 but 0.
This result also requires that the series ∆lnc t be conditionally homoskedastic. Otherwise, the quantity 0 0 ln ln
would be stochastic. 13 In agreement with the theory, the estimates for ψ 1 , ψ 2 , and ψ 3 are virtually identical if one proxies r t with the real after-tax rates of return calculated from rolling over one-, two-, three-, four-, or six-month Treasury discount bonds. The same is true for the estimates of ψ 2 and ψ 3 obtained using proxies calculated from the nominal one-year holdingperiod yields on 1¼-, 1½-, 1¾-, 2-, 2½-, 3-, 4-, 5-, 6-, 7-, 8-, 9-, and 10-year Treasury discount bonds. The estimate of ψ 1 , however, declines with the term of the bond in this case. This result suggests that households may be less willing to substitute consumption in response to anticipated capital gains and losses than to anticipated real returns paid out as coupons. Such an anomaly would appear to violate Modigliani-Miller neutrality. To the extent that the latter evidence has credence, the calculations in the next section should use a smaller elasticity of intertemporal substitution and obtain larger effects of social security reform on the capital stock, output, and consumption. 
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is estimated to be negative, albeit insignificantly so. 
where i is an index indicating the type of household (e.g., distinguished by marital status, age, etc.), N it is the number of households of type i in year t, J i is the maximum number of years that households of type i can live, r is the discount rate used in the calculation, P ijt is the probability that households of type i in year t survive at least j years into the future, and B ijt is the net benefit that households of type i anticipate as of year t receiving from social security in year t+j, conditional on surviving until then. Net benefits equal pensions receipts less payroll tax payments. 16 In his 1974 endeavor, Feldstein made the following assumptions in specifying B ijt : (i) households anticipated retiring when their heads reached age 65; (ii) they anticipated receiving a pension equal to 41 percent of the per capita disposable income prevailing at that time; (iii) they anticipated paying a fixed fraction θ jt of the per capita disposable income prevailing in the years prior to retirement and nothing in subsequent years; (iv) they anticipated that disposable income would grow at a constant rate g, equal to the average growth rate of disposable income over the sample period; (v) the quantity θ jt is the actual fraction of per capita disposable income paid as social security taxes in years included 
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The overidentifying restrictions now pass muster easily. The estimates of ψ 2 and ψ 3 are highly significantly negative, providing strong evidence against Ricardian equivalence. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is estimated to be .63, a plausible value. 18, 19 It is statistically significantly less than one at the .05 level, however, suggesting that the parameters ψ 2 and ψ 3 may not actually be constant as posited in section II.
According to the theory, the rate of growth of consumption for households alive in both periods t-1 and t is within a constant of in the sample; and (vi) in years that would occur after the end of the sample, θ jt is the fraction of disposable income paid as social security taxes in the last year of the sample. 17 For purposes of display, the sample means of the series are removed in Figures 1 and 2 
The top panel of Figure 2 plots five-year centered moving averages of the real after-tax rate of return and the adjusted consumption growth rate (13). Both moving averages exhibit similar and closely aligned long waves. The corrections that (13) adds to the aggregate consumption growth rate radically alter its properties. In particular, the adjusted consumption growth rate is much more persistent and is substantially lower in the early 1950s and the mid-1970 than the aggregate consumption growth rate. Consequently, the two moving averages are strongly positively correlated with each other as the bottom panel shows.
The theory of the previous section assumed that households do not face binding constraints on borrowing. Campbell and Mankiw (1989 , 1990 , 1991 
in lieu of equation (3), where w t is real disposable wage income in the fourth quarter of year t divided by the mid-quarter resident population. An appreciable and significantly negative estimate of ψ 4 would then indicate that binding constraints on borrowing have important effects on consumption and asset prices.
I used GMM to fit equation (14) to the data over the sample period 1950-1993. The instrumental variables were the intercept and two lags each of r t , ∆lnc t , (a t +π t )/c t , s t /c t , and ∆lnw t . 
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The parameter ψ 4 is numerically small and statistically insignificant at any reasonable level.
Therefore, no evidence is found for binding constraints on borrowing.
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IV. Effects of Social Security Reform
In this section, I calculate the steady-state values implied by a simple nonstochastic computational general-equilibrium model embedding the estimated equation (12). My purpose is to evaluate the economic significance of the estimates for ψ 2 and ψ 3 . The model is highly stylized and calibrated to match only the grossest features of the US economy. Furthermore, it has been validated only to the extent that equation (12) does appear to fit the aggregate data reasonably well.
For these reasons, the results are primarily useful in assessing economic significance, though they may give some idea of the size of social security's likely steady-state effects.
I assume that the economy is closed and has the intensive Cobb-Douglas production
where q and k are steady-state gross output and capital per efficiency unit of labor. I choose the parameter A so that the capital-output ratio is 2.5 years in the initial steady state in which q is normalized to one per year. The choice of 1 3 for the elasticity of output with respect to the capital stock is entirely conventional; e.g., Campbell (1994) .
I further assume that the owners of capital receive its net marginal product after paying a uniform 30 percent to the government as taxes. The depreciation rate on capital is taken to be 4 percent a year, which is consistent with the assumed capital-output ratio of 2.5 years and the fact that depreciation accounts for roughly 10 percent of GDP. Consequently,
where r is the steady-state after-tax real interest rate.
In addition, I assume that the number of efficiency units of labor grows exogenously at a rate of 2.5 percent a year, inducing the capital stock, gross output, and consumption also to grow at that rate in the steady state. 22 I also assume that the government absorbs 18 percent of gross output, roughly its share of GDP in the late 1990s. As a result, in the steady state,
where c is steady-state consumption per efficiency unit of labor.
I assume that the government debt policy results in a steady-state ratio of debt to total consumption of .653 years, roughly its value in the late 1990s. Given this assumption,
.653 a a k r r c c c
since t t t r a π = .
Finally, I assume that population as well as the number of efficiency units of labor grows at a constant exogenous rate in the steady state. As a result, equation (12) 
where B is a free parameter selected in order to make equation (20) balance in steady states.
23
Now, consider the reform of social security. For the purposes of this paper, the reform is taken to be a reduction in the steady-state ratio of social security wealth to consumption with no offsetting increase in the steady-state ratio of government debt to consumption. Although many of the proposals put forward do entail temporary increases in the debt ratio and in practice might entail permanent increases, any such proposal has effects identical to those of a proposal that merely reduces social security wealth less in the first place with no offset. I therefore consider reform proposals that differ only in the ultimate extent to which they reduce the steady-state value of s/c.
22 I am thus abstracting from any benefits that social security reform might have in reducing tax distortions in the labor market. As pointed out by Murphy and Welch (1998) , these benefits can in principle be obtained without fundamentally changing the character of social security. 23 The free parameter B is composed of three terms, which I assume to be constant across all steady states. The first is the growth rate of per capita consumption. This term is constant in all steady states for which the growth rates of population and the per capita number of efficiency units of labor are constant. Second, the negative of the intercept in equation (12). Third, the difference between the means of the after-tax marginal product of capital and the real after-tax rate of return on one-year Treasury discount bonds. This term, which is positive and substantial, consists of risk premia. Figure 3 and is upward sloping, indicating that the US capital stock is well below its golden-rule level. A reform that completely eliminated social security wealth would raise consumption by about five percent in the steady state, a sizeable effect.
How do these effects compare with those found in the literature using computational general-equilibrium models? Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (1998) closeness of these effects, however, since both come from models that are easy to criticize. The important point is that the aggregate effects from social security reform are likely to be large. Even if the true effects were half as large as these, one would still conclude that they are large.
24 Let ( ) and ( ) be the solutions for and corresponding to the th value of / . Figures 3 and 4 
V. Conclusions
This paper found strong empirical evidence that social security affects the US economy.
The estimated effects are highly significant not only statistically but also economically. In addition, the empirical investigation yielded four important byproducts. First, unlike much of the previous literature, the overidentifying restrictions of the augmented Euler equation fitted here were not rejected. Augmenting the standard Euler equation with wealth terms enables it to pass muster.
Second, no evidence was found for binding constraints on borrowing once the wealth terms were included. Third, strong evidence was found for a substantial elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Fourth, Ricardian equivalence was resoundingly rejected. 
For convenience, I use the same symbol to denote the intercepts in equation (A.12) and (5) even though they generally differ.
The quantity µ t in equation (A.12) is the marginal propensity to consume from wealth.
According to equation (A.8), it is constant if α, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, equals one or if r t , the real interest rate, is serially independent. In either case, equation (3) 
Appendix B
Real expenditure on nondurable goods and services is the sum of lines 4 and 5 of NIPA Table 2 .1 less nominal after-tax asset income divided by the deflator for expenditures on nondurable goods and services. Before-tax asset income is national income minus compensation of employees minus a fraction ω of proprietors' income plus net government interest payments minus government interest payments to foreigners. These series are lines 1, 2, and 9 of NIPA Table 1 .14 and lines 13 and 16 of NIPA Table 3 .1. The fraction ω is the ratio of employee compensation to national income less proprietors' income. (The assumption being made here is that compensation for proprietors' labor services represents the same fraction of total proprietors' income as compensation is in the rest of national income.) After-tax asset income is before-tax asset income minus corporate profits taxes minus federal inheritance taxes minus other personal state and local taxes minus a fraction ζ of income taxes minus the inflation tax
t , where CPI t is the consumer price index for December of year t and GNFA t is government net financial assets. These series are line 3 of NIPA Table 3 .1, line 4 of NIPA Table 3 .2, line 5 of Table 3 .3, the sum of line 3 of NIPA Table 3 .2 and line 3 of NIPA Table   3 .3, page C-27 of the January/February issue of the Survey of Current Business and a printout provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and Table B-114 of the 1995 Economic Report of the President. The fraction ζ is the ratio before-tax asset income minus corporate profits taxes to national income plus net government interest payments minus corporate profits taxes. (The assumptions being made here are that asset income is taxed at the same average rate as compensation and that only corporate profits taxes are deductible against income taxes.) All NIPA data come from a diskette provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 26 They report their data as continuously discounted rates. The simple interest rates plugged into equation (10) were calculated by exponentiating their series and subtracting one.
